

Measuring Data Leakage in Machine-Learning Models with Fisher Information

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Fisher Information Loss (FIL)

- $I_h(D)$ is the *Fisher information matrix* of model h for dataset D
- h has *Fisher information loss* of η with respect to D if:

$$\|I_h(D)\|_2 \leq \eta^2$$

- The largest singular value of $I_h(D)$ is bounded by η^2

Output Perturbation and FIL

- The *Gaussian mechanism* adds noise $b \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I)$ to model w^* :

$$w_{\text{priv}} = w^* + b$$

- The FIL of the Gaussian mechanism with standard deviation σ is:


$$\eta = \frac{1}{\sigma} \|J_f\|_2$$

- J_f is the Jacobian of the minimizer with respect to the data

Properties of FIL

- Compute FIL for different subsets of the training set

- Individual attributes
- Individual examples
- Groups of examples
- The full dataset





Properties of FIL

- By the Cramér-Rao bound, for any unbiased estimator \hat{x} of x :


$$\text{Var}(\hat{x}) \geq \frac{1}{\eta^2}$$

- FIL provides security even with intra-dataset correlations
- Composes additively and closed under post-processing

Fisher Information Loss: MNIST



Fisher Information Loss: MNIST



Fisher Information Loss: CIFAR-10



Iteratively Reweighted FIL

Goal: Equitably distribute privacy loss for individuals in the data


Algorithm: Iteratively Reweighted FIL (IRFIL)

Iterate 1 . . . T

1: Train model

2: Compute example-level FIL (η_i)



3: New loss with weights $\propto 1/\eta_i$



Fairness Under Adversarial Attacks

IWPC dataset: classify patients by medical dosage

- Target feature is one of three possible alleles of a gene



Fairness Under Adversarial Attacks

UCI adult dataset: classify individuals by salary given demographic features

- Target feature is marital status

