

# An Invitation to Modal Logic: Lecture 5

Philosophy 150

Eric Pacuit

Stanford University  
`ai.stanford.edu/~epacuit`

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## Plan

- ✓ Motivating Examples
- ✓ Formalizing the muddy children puzzle, Introduction to Modal Logic
- ✓ More about truth of modal formulas
- ✓ Summary so far.  
**Digression:** A small experiment.

12/5: Focus on Epistemic Logic, Dynamics in Logic

12/7: Dynamics in Logic II

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$LP$ : “ $P$  is an epistemic possibility”

$KLP$ : “Ann knows that she thinks  $P$  is possible”



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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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


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


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What idealizations have we made?

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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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Two issues

Suppose we want to be completely formal in our solution to the muddy children puzzle, what is Epistemic Logic missing?

1. **Group knowledge** (all the children know there is at least one muddy child, they all know this fact, they all know that they know this fact, etc.).
2. **Public announcements** (various statements are publicly announced in the course of the puzzle).

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
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


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


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


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- ▶ No! ( $G_2$  thinks that 'perhaps  $G_1$  did not receive  $m'$  and  $G_1$  knows this).

## The Generals Puzzle

Imagine two allied generals,  $G_1$  and  $G_2$ , standing on two mountain summits, with their enemy in the valley between them. Both  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  know that if they attack at the same time, then they will defeat the enemy, but if only one attacks then he will certainly lose the battle.

- ▶  $G_1$  sends a message  $m = \text{"Let's attack at 8 AM"}$ ; however it is not guaranteed that the message will arrive.
- ▶ Suppose  $G_2$  receives message  $m$ . Should they attack?
- ▶ No! ( $G_1$  thinks that 'perhaps  $G_2$  did not receive  $m$ .'). So,  $G_2$  sends a message  $m' = \text{"OK, let's attack at 8AM"}$ .
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- ▶ So  $G_1$  sends a message  $m''$ , ...

## Spreading Gossip

Suppose that there are three friends, Ann, Bob and Charles, and Ann learns a interesting piece of news ( $P$ ). If each of the friends are at home, how many calls are needed to create common knowledge that  $P$ ?

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


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Suppose there are three cards:  
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Suppose that Ann receives card  
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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## Something to Think About

1. Suppose Ann and Bob both know that two numbers  $n$  and  $n + 1$  will be chosen and placed on their foreheads. They will be able to see the other player's number, but not their own. Say 3 is written on Ann's forehead and 4 is written on Bob's forehead. Draw a Kripke structure that represents this situation (it is infinite). Is it common knowledge that the numbers are less than 1000? What happens if the agents start (truthfully) announcing "I don't know my number."?

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2. **Russian Cards Problem:** From a deck of seven cards Ann and Bob each receive three cards and Charles the remaining card. How can Ann and Bob openly inform each other about their cards, without informing Charles who holds which card?

**Next lecture:** Dynamics in logic.

Questions?

**Email:** [epacuit@stanford.edu](mailto:epacuit@stanford.edu)

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**Office:** Gates 258