Conditional Logics of Belief Change
N. Friedman and J. Y. Halpern
In Proc. National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI '94).
AAAI Press, Menlo Park, Calif.
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The study of belief change has been an active area in
philosophy and AI. In recent years two
special cases of belief change, belief revision and
belief update, have
been studied in detail.
Belief revision and update are clearly not the only possible notions of
In this paper we
investigate properties of a range of possible belief change
operations. We start with an abstract notion of a belief change
system and provide a logical language that describes belief
change in such systems. We then consider several reasonable properties
one can impose
on such systems and characterize them axiomatically. We
show that both belief revision and update fit into our classification.
As a consequence, we get both a semantic and an axiomatic
(proof-theoretic) characterization of belief revision and update (as
well as some belief change operations that generalize them), in one
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