Date | Lecture | Notes/Readings |
8/30 |
Introductory Remarks (initial quiz) |
|
9/4 |
Introductory remarks (slides) |
Section 1 of [Voting Methods] |
9/6 |
The rational choice model (slides) |
Chapter 2 of [AP]
Problem Set 1: exercises 2, 4 and 6, Chapter 2 of [AP], pgs. 35- 37 |
9/11 |
Paradoxes of Voting, I (slides) |
Section 3.1 of [Voting Methods] and Chapter 4, pgs. 53 - 67 of [AP] |
9/13 |
Paradoxes of Voting, II (slides) |
Chapter 4, pgs. 53 - 67 of [AP] and Chapter 3 of [AP]
Problem Set 1 Due
G. Asan and R. Sanver, Another characterization of the majority rule, Economics Letters, 75:3, 2002 |
9/18 |
Paradoxes of Voting, III (slides) |
Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of [Voting Methods] |
9/20 |
Arrow's Theorem (handout)
J. Geanakoplos, Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Theorem (we will discuss Proof 1), Economic Theory, 26, pgs. 211 - 215, 2005. |
Chapter 4, pgs. 67 -89 of [AP]
Chapter 5 of Riker's Liberalism without Populism |
9/25 |
Arrow's Theorem, continued (handout)
Domain Restrictions: Single-Peakedness and Value Restrictions (slides) |
pgs. 81- 85 of [AP] Problem Set 2: exercises 2, 3 and 4, Chapter 4 of [AP], pgs. 86, 87 |
9/27 |
Spatial Models of Majority Rule (slides) |
Chapter 5 of [AP], pgs. 90 - 123 |
10/2 |
Condorcet Jury Theorem and Paradoxes of Judgement Aggregation (slides) |
Chapter 11 of S. Nitzan, Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (available in class) |
10/4 |
Doctrinal Paradox, Sen's Liberal Paradox (slides)
|
C. List and P. Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110, 2002
A. Sen, Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal, Journal of Political Economy, 78:1, pgs. 152 - 157, 1970
Problem Set 2 Due |
10/9 |
Strategizing, I (slides) |
Chapter 2 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005. |
10/11 |
No Class (instructor away at conference) |
|
10/16 |
Strategizing, II (slides) |
Chapter 2 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005. |
10/18 |
Strategizing, III |
Section 3.1 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
K. Dowding and M. van Hees, In Praise of Manipulation, British Journal of Political Science, 38:1, pgs. 1 - 15, 2008. |
10/23 |
Distance Based Voting Methods, I (slides) |
H. P. Young. Optimal Voting Rules. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9:1, pgs. 51 - 64, 1995. |
10/25 |
Distance Based Voting Methods, II and Approval Voting (slides) |
S. Brams, Chapter 2 in Mathematics and Democracy |
10/30 |
University Closed |
|
11/1 |
Approval Voting (slides) |
E. Aragones, I Gilboa, and A. Weiss, Making statements and approval voting,Theory and Decision, 71:4, pp. 461 - 472, 2011
|
11/6 |
Majoritarian Judgement, I (slides) |
Problem Set 3: exercise 7 on pg. 190, 1 on pg. 222, 3a and 3b. on pg. 223,224
Midterm Papers Due |
11/8 |
Majoritarian Judgement, II (slides) |
|
11/13 |
Combining Approval and Preference (slides) |
Problem Set 3 Due |
11/15 |
Introduction to Fair Division (slides) |
|
11/20 |
Adjusted Winner (slides) |
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/ |
11/22 |
Thanksgiving break |
|
11/27 |
Cake-Cutting Algorithms, I |
Chapter 1 of J. Robertson and W. Web. Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You
Can. A K Peters/CRC Press, 1998. |
11/29 |
Cake-Cutting Algorithms, II |
Chapter 1 of J. Robertson and W. Web. Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You
Can. A K Peters/CRC Press, 1998. |
12/4 |
Cake-Cutting Algorithms, III (slides) |
Problem Set 4 |
12/6 |
Cake-Cutting Algorithms, IV (slides) |
|
12/11 |
Concluding Remarks and Review (slides) |
Final Exam Material Problem Set 4 Due |
12/18 |
Final Exam, 4-6 PM, SKN 1112 |
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