8/30 
Introductory Remarks (initial quiz) 

9/4 
Introductory remarks (slides) 
Section 1 of [Voting Methods] 
9/6 
The rational choice model (slides) 
Chapter 2 of [AP]
Problem Set 1: exercises 2, 4 and 6, Chapter 2 of [AP], pgs. 35 37 
9/11 
Paradoxes of Voting, I (slides) 
Section 3.1 of [Voting Methods] and Chapter 4, pgs. 53  67 of [AP] 
9/13 
Paradoxes of Voting, II (slides) 
Chapter 4, pgs. 53  67 of [AP] and Chapter 3 of [AP]
Problem Set 1 Due
G. Asan and R. Sanver, Another characterization of the majority rule, Economics Letters, 75:3, 2002 
9/18 
Paradoxes of Voting, III (slides) 
Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of [Voting Methods] 
9/20 
Arrow's Theorem (handout)
J. Geanakoplos, Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Theorem (we will discuss Proof 1), Economic Theory, 26, pgs. 211  215, 2005. 
Chapter 4, pgs. 67 89 of [AP]
Chapter 5 of Riker's Liberalism without Populism 
9/25 
Arrow's Theorem, continued (handout)
Domain Restrictions: SinglePeakedness and Value Restrictions (slides) 
pgs. 81 85 of [AP] Problem Set 2: exercises 2, 3 and 4, Chapter 4 of [AP], pgs. 86, 87 
9/27 
Spatial Models of Majority Rule (slides) 
Chapter 5 of [AP], pgs. 90  123 
10/2 
Condorcet Jury Theorem and Paradoxes of Judgement Aggregation (slides) 
Chapter 11 of S. Nitzan, Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (available in class) 
10/4 
Doctrinal Paradox, Sen's Liberal Paradox (slides)

C. List and P. Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result, Economics and Philosophy 18: 89110, 2002
A. Sen, Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal, Journal of Political Economy, 78:1, pgs. 152  157, 1970
Problem Set 2 Due 
10/9 
Strategizing, I (slides) 
Chapter 2 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
10/11 
No Class (instructor away at conference) 

10/16 
Strategizing, II (slides) 
Chapter 2 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
10/18 
Strategizing, III 
Section 3.1 of A. Taylor, Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
K. Dowding and M. van Hees, In Praise of Manipulation, British Journal of Political Science, 38:1, pgs. 1  15, 2008. 
10/23 
Distance Based Voting Methods, I (slides) 
H. P. Young. Optimal Voting Rules. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9:1, pgs. 51  64, 1995. 
10/25 
Distance Based Voting Methods, II and Approval Voting (slides) 
S. Brams, Chapter 2 in Mathematics and Democracy 
10/30 
University Closed 

11/1 
Approval Voting (slides) 
E. Aragones, I Gilboa, and A. Weiss, Making statements and approval voting,Theory and Decision, 71:4, pp. 461  472, 2011

11/6 
Majoritarian Judgement, I (slides) 
Problem Set 3: exercise 7 on pg. 190, 1 on pg. 222, 3a and 3b. on pg. 223,224
Midterm Papers Due 
11/8 
Majoritarian Judgement, II (slides) 

11/13 
Combining Approval and Preference (slides) 
Problem Set 3 Due 
11/15 
Introduction to Fair Division (slides) 

11/20 
Adjusted Winner (slides) 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/ 
11/22 
Thanksgiving break 

11/27 
CakeCutting Algorithms, I 
Chapter 1 of J. Robertson and W. Web. CakeCutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You
Can. A K Peters/CRC Press, 1998. 
11/29 
CakeCutting Algorithms, II 
Chapter 1 of J. Robertson and W. Web. CakeCutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You
Can. A K Peters/CRC Press, 1998. 
12/4 
CakeCutting Algorithms, III (slides) 
Problem Set 4 
12/6 
CakeCutting Algorithms, IV (slides) 

12/11 
Concluding Remarks and Review (slides) 
Final Exam Material Problem Set 4 Due 
12/18 
Final Exam, 46 PM, SKN 1112 
